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ABSTRACT

Since the rise of science and technology in the latter part of the last century, teachers in the humanities have experienced extreme pressure to justify the place of the humanities in a progressive, scientifically oriented culture. Critics have termed humanists variously as elitist, because they concern themselves with moral priorities rather than with epistemological or political ones; backward-looking, since history is at the core of the humanities; withdrawn from society, since humanists do not produce results with immediate social consequences; and scientifically suspect, since the humanities use intuition and judgment as tools of inquiry. In their efforts to answer the criticism and defend their place in higher education, humanities faculty have made a number of individual and collective mistakes. They have sought, with questionable success, to emulate scientific paradigms and methodologies. Then, working even harder to make their suspect methodologies respectable, they have removed anything resembling fun from the educational process. They have attempted to answer criticism about the lack of relevance of the humanities to the vocational orientation of modern majors by defending their disciplines as if they were "eternal verities"; by making excessive claims for the humanities as if they could provide conclusive answers; by making inappropriate attempts to "vocationalize" the humanities; and by flooding the curriculum with Black Studies, Women's Studies, Indian Studies, etc., which in spite of many well-planned and well-taught courses, did not last and brought down the standards which the humanities were so anxious to maintain. Submerged in the wave of practicalism that has characterized higher education for the past decade, the humanities are indeed in disarray. Administrators can help take the stress off the humanists by placing primary emphasis on the validity of their teaching; by reaffirming the quintessential value of the humanities in higher education; and by celebrating the "faculty of dissent" which provides a necessary balance for the prevailing myth of objective consciousness. (AYC)

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THE FACULTY OF DISSENT:
AN ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE HUMANITIES

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THE FACULTY OF DISSENT
An Administrative Perspective on the Humanities

When one crosses over the line from teaching to become an academic administrator, it is likely that the perspective he takes on the various disciplines will change. No doubt his new role obfuscates his view at the same time that it clarifies it, for one who once perceived the harmonies among faculties now begins to recognize that there is a diffusion of effort, a malaise, an unease with the organization among former colleagues who previously had been seen only in individualistic scholarly roles, and this seems especially so in divisions of Humanities.

As an administrator, one begins to sense that the organizational structure of the college may be one of the sources of stress, one of the reasons why teachers in the Humanities never seem to be able to speak with one voice, why they resist change as if it were merely unwanted administrative incursion, why they often seem dispirited about their place in the scheme of institutuional life. Feeling this strongly, I asked a respected veteran administrator, Lewis Cochran, former Vice President of the University of Kentucky, whether I were alone in this perception. He thought not, replying that "the Humanities have been under severe pressures for a long time, and I think that because of these pressures they have made a number of individual and collective mistakes: 1)attempts to vocationalize the Humanities, or to seek "relevance," are inappropriate; 2)pressure to publish has led to fragmented, tedious, and jargon-filled articles of interest to very few people. Witness the few subscribers to scholarly journals! 3)The need for recognition has led to self-destructive in-fighting to the benefit of no one. Let's face it, few Humanists will write "great books." The important job is to interpret the great works, which means teaching, and,

if you will, indoctrination to value systems that will increase humaneness. Cynics are not very successful at this. The Humanists are essential to a good program in higher education. It has troubled me that their effective defense has had to come from outside the Humanities, from people ill-equipped to make that defense."

In recent years, the sciences have come under some critism, but never have the scientific disciplines experienced the extreme pressure placed upon the Humanists in academic organizations, where in the post-Sputnik era an intensified need for self-justification has sapped energy and been counter productive to good morale. Those persons teaching in the so-called "Humanities" are very commonly regarded as reactionaries in a progressive, scientifically oriented culture, where since the latter part of the last century, science and technology have been in the ascendancy in academic life, while the Humanities have retreated in a variety of directions, their role often being confused in the absence of distinction between it and "the Liberal Arts" or "general education". As the breach between "the two cultures" has widened, the Humanities have fought to retain a role in higher education; perhaps surprisingly, since our culture is essentially one in its orientation to science and its treatment of the Humanities as a kind of frill, relegated to the role of a service agency, Humanists have kept that place.

In <u>On The Philosophy of Higher Education</u>, John S. Brubacher describes how the epistemological and the political philosophies of education — popularly embodied in the terms "scholarship" and "service" — have been in opposition to each other ever since the advent of the great research oriented universities. Their one common thread has been a belief in scientific techniques. Brubacher, a pragmatist, believes that the only way in which these two predominant modes of thought can be reconciled is in a philosophy of

pragmatism, which permits thought and action to coexist. He acknowledges, almost in an aside, that there is a third point of view, that of those who reject rationalism as the sole acceptable method of ascertaining truth. For the most part, Humanists fall into this third category, and in a sense the fact of Brubacher's matter-of-factness emphasizes how far the Humanities have fallen away from the mainstream of the philosophies governing modern higher education. Since the rise of science, teachers in the Humanities have been the Faculty of Dissent.

The tradition of the Humanities stretches back to the time of Roman civilization, when "humanitas" meant cultivation and moral responsibility. But an inevitable clash between "value-free" scientific research and disciplines which purported to inculate values was not long in coming after the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. However, it should be kept in mind, as Brubacher and Rudy have pointed out, that the early American universities were established for essentially conservative purposes; they were designed to preserve the traditions of European culture. Curricula were devoted to subjects which would create well rounded professional gentlemen in the Renaissance tradition, but it was not long before science took its place as an important part of the curriculum — as early as 1728 a Harvard Professorship in Science was established.

Because the Humanities study traditional materials, looking to the past to enrich the present, the reform of the college curriculum which received great impetus in the post Civil War era included the desire for more progressive and immediate objective knowledge than the Humanities could possibly provide. Down through the middle of the nineteenth century, the American college provided a four year regime which sought to strengthen piety and charactor; however, the old mental discipline aspiration began to break down under

the reform efforts of the new leaders who appeared after the Civil War. Defenders of "the old order" -- the traditional liberal arts curriculum — had voiced their hostility to change in the Yale Report of 1828 and on numerous other occasions. According to Laurence R. Veysey, in The Emergence of the American University, three conceptions of academic reform appeared after 1865: these were the ideas of service, research, and of liberal culture.

It was the advocates of Liberal Culture who refused to accept the triumph of utility and research in the new universities, and it was the period of the late nineteenth century in which learned men came to be divided into two categories; the line between the sciences and humanities was drawn. Not all teachers of the Humanities shunned science, but those who wished to return to the liberal education of the gentlemen were by far the most vocal of the Humanists. Other defenders of the liberal arts in later periods, like Robert Maynard Hutchins at Chicago and then Scott Buchanan at St. John's, have advocated the study of the great works as a mental discipline, a means of sharpening the intellectual capacities, but this has not been the predominating mode in the Humanities.

Between 1865 and 1920, the Humanities became departmentalized into separate disciplines of art, philosophy, history, modern languages, classics, and so forth. The tendency to specialize brought about many subdivisions within these realms, and professionalism made these departments very much like each other. These departments became bastions for an elite which was isolated from the mainstream of life. Within the universities this elite stood for an orientation to the past, but it was a very selective past, centering on certain individuals, from Plato to Emerson, who were thought to be carriers of a single, worthy tradition which carried a timeless

morality. This elitism became a new religion, replacing the earlier devotion to the scriptures. Since the Humanities existed to uphold standards, scholarship investigated only the agreed-upon civilization, without posing any challenge to ethical generalizations held by upper middle classes. In "The PluralOrganized Worlds of the Humanities," Veysey asserted that "Humanists were very rarely pluralists. Instead, with absolutist assurance they asserted the continued universal need for their tradition-based recipe for learning — and for social respectability." Uneasy about the hordes of new immigrants coming into the country, they looked to England for cultural standards and asserted claims to hierarchy, which they identified with such values as reason and order.[1]

Even though Humanists were rapidly becoming underdogs, they continued to exercise a great deal of influence in the universities. But as the years went on, a negative militancy of tone made itself obvious. Veysey suggests that the term "Humanities" changed its meaning during a long process that began in the 1870's and continued into the 1940's. At first it meant the resistance of classicists to the rapid diversification of subject matter; next the word was adopted by spokesmen of the younger disciplines; then the word was converted by a new minority into a rallying cry for a new interdisciplinary campaign, which disquised its increasing use as a covering label for administrative convenience. In a way, the use of "Humanities" came about by default — all disciplines that were not scientific were given this label. The new social sciences actually had a greater sense of their interrelatedness than did the Humanities disciplines. It was more likely confusion, drift, and retreatism that held them together. One of the reasons why the Humanities are considered to be elitist is that they concern themselves with moral priorities rather than with epistemological or political

ones. Also, since history is at the core of the Humanities, backwardlookingness is suspect in a democracy which is committed to progress. According to Morton Bloomfield, there was another aspect of the American temperament which was hostile to the Humanities: "culture was for snobs, lotharios, and women." It was useless for real men who had real things to accomplish. The great technological innovations of our century which have made mass education possible have furthered the sterotype of elitism which the Humanities have carried because they were nonvocational. In addition, the great expansion of knowledge created in part by technology has brought about a kind of mystical elite, who devote their time to exegesis of textual material, seemingly unnecessary in an oral, visual, and less verbal society where book-orientation is much less that it had been formerly. In the mind of the public, Humanists use language that is not easy to understand, and Bloomfield asserts that they seem to be "high priests of the obvious," since anyone can read a book.[2]

Furthermore, ironically, the Humanist is usually withdrawn from society. Unlike the scientists, Humanists do not produce results with immediate social consequences. Primarily though, the Humanities and the sciences utilize "two different maps of reality" - the natural sciences, with their interest in factuality, and the Humanities with their interest in man's imagination, speak two different languages. In Levi's words, "without an intuition of form and organic unity which is the basis of all taste and all aesthetic judgment, without the insistent claims of moral obligation which gives life its peculiarly social flavor and consolidates all institutional bonds, the humanities are unthinkable." Levi's use of the word "intuition," of course, is instructive, because it further dramatizes the distinction between the sciences and the Humanities. Intuition and judgment as tools of inquiry make Humanities scholarship suspect in the eyes of the scientist. Almost defensively, in

order to rationalize the use of these tools, the Humanist will claim that they are necessary in understanding values.

And it is values which many of the Humanists are primarily interested in. Attempts to quantify values inquiry has caused some of the older scholars a great deal of concern in the Humanities disciplines. In an essay entitled "The Eclipse of the Liberal Arts", in 1976, Bernard Murchland conjectured that there seemed to be evidence that "the Humanities do not humanize, that the liberal arts do not liberate, that indeed the tradition itself is dead." The mission of liberal education, he asserted, is to determine and clarify human needs and values:

> The role of education in its classical conception was first of all to train citizens to a sense of their own selfhood and secondly to train them to consider reflectively the ideals most likely to give meaning and direction to their communal experience. But whether the emphasis was social or individual, education was in all cases radically pragmatic in the sense that it always envisioned the most enlightned ways of acting.

The liberal arts were intended to be training for freedom, and therefore they were based upon a humanistic rationality that was primarily concerned with value considerations. Murchland is concerned that modern Humanists put their rational energies to the task of quantifying and determining workable equations between knowledge and power. This "cognitive rationality" is characterized by value neutrality, which eliminates value choices as subjective, and therefore regards them as unreliable; congnitive rationalify opposes values because they are not scientific but emotive:

> By now, cognitive rationality has become codified in all the representative techniques of modern society, in science and technology, most obviously, but also in business and government bureaucracy, an increasingly in the pervasive forms of social engineering. And, of course, in education from its traditional goal of forming a moral personality. In this sense we can speak with some literal truth of the death of the liberal arts.[4]

In other words, by emulating the scientists, Humanists were destroying their own endeavor. In this respect, Murchland agrees with Cochran.

Indeed, the search for a paradigm has been one of the chief troubles with the Hum ities. When Humanists use words like "intuition" they are using the language of faith, so they shy away from such language in favor of more scientific language. When they move toward scientific methodology, they can no longer "philosophize" about morality, truth, goodness, and other values. Richard Ohmann in English in America: A Radical View of the Profession, 1976, feels that the fact that the Humanities disciplines emulate the model of the natural sciences without having the same shared paradigms makes them untenable:

> We have no coherent system of principles which relates every finding to every other one, however remotely — and incidentally, which permits us to adjudicate among competing interpretations of poems. For this reason, the phrase 'contribution to knowledge' is particularly misleading in our field. It implies a gathering together, a consolidation in men's minds, whereas in fact the consolidation can only take place in an archive or an information retrieval system. In literary research, after a point, more is less, and less is more.

He goes on to explain the moral basis of literature:

> A biologist may hold the life of planaria in reverence, and his research may even contribute to his attitude, but such a morality is only a fringe benefit of that research. On the other hand, behind every teacher of literature lurks a moralist, and for good reason. The experience of literature is quite inseparable from moral experience, even less than from esthetic.

One of the functions of literature and literacy culture is to extend moral experience:

> Our activities and publication imitate those of the sciences, whose effort is toward the abstract and impersonal. The model is a bad one for us, since our inquiries point ultimately toward the concrete and personal.[5]

Another way to look at some of the problems with the Humanities is to try to see what they do have in common. One particular shared attitude is one of alienation and dissent, and this attitude derives from several sources. The anti-organizational bias in Humanistic thought comes both from the nature of

the ideas which they study and usually is joined by a personal predilection for individualism, mysticism, and a high regard for the sanctity of one's own mind. For the most part, western Literature is a literature of alienation, of reaction against mainstream culture and mundane thought. This, of course, is the source of its greatness, its imperative power, and also the fact that many of those who study it reflect the same feelings. Identification with high culture is also the source from which derives much of their criticism as elitists. Probably no more than any other intellecturals do Humanists on a private level reflect some dismay at popular culture, but their reaction is often on a institutionalized level. The physicist who despises rock music and the idiocy of some television offerings does so as part of his personal point of view, not as his professional one, whereas the Humanist probably allows judgments such as that to enter into the world view of his professional work.

In discussing the power of concensus, the sociologist Jeffrey Pfeffer in Power in Organizations, 1981, studied departments in four fields. He concluded that:

> Fields that were highly developed had widely shared exemplars, methodologies, and consensus concerning the knowledge and technology of the field. Such was not the case for fields with less developed paradigms.

The concensus and technological certainty have a number of effects which enhance the power of the subunit. Thus, the physical sciences, with their higher level of paradigm development, received more money than did fields with less developed paradigms, primarily because those granting the money found the return on research funds more predictable. A second finding was that consensus facilitates cohesion and a common position within a discipline. "Faculty members who have more consensus can form stronger and more effective coalitions than those in fields rife with internal conflicts."[6]

Humanities faculties are notorious for their inability to agree upon anything, with one exception. While most of the time, members of Humanities divisions fight among themselves, they will unite only when an exterior agent (an administrator perhaps) threatens to take something away from them or change their status. As reactionaries to prevailing conditions, they can come to temporary consensus. But Pfeffer's conclusions may apply also to the fact that often Humanities faculties have less power over institutional decision-making than do other bodies within a university.

Murchland discusses what he called the "pedagogy of alienation." Whereas cognitive rationality is appropriate in graduate study, it seeps down into undergraduate study, where it insists for undergraduates that value choices are merely subjective and therefore of questionable validity. Another fruit of alienation is the absence of anything resembling fun in the educational process. Murchland here means "fun" in the sense of joy one receives in learning, which is an intrinsic need of the human being.[7]

Perhaps this to some degree explains why Humanists often take themselves and their work so seriously. Since their methodology is suspect, they work all the harder at making it respectable, and in the process take all the fun out of the effort. What more lugubrious place is there than a meeting of a Humanities Division faculty?

The turbulent era of the 1960's left a lasting mark upon the Humanities in at least three respects. Challenges to education in general, but to the Humanities in particular, formed themselves in three devastating attacks: the first was a rejection of history, the second a rejection of the Humanities on the basis of their lack of relevance, and the third was an attack upon their corruption of motives. Pressing upon the heals of that era was the perhaps more damaging era of scarcity which followed in the 1970's, when economic

pressures and an oversupply of trained people in the field brought about even greater stress.

One of the more provocative books coming out of the late 1960's was a collection of essays by radical Humanists. This criticism from within the academy served to reinforce student radicals' calls for relevance from outside the disciplines. The Dissenting Academy, edited by Theodore Roszak, attacked both the disciplines in the Humanities and the University itself. First of all, Roszak disdained the complacency of the academic mind:

> The academic life may be busy and anxious, but it is the business and anxiety of careerist competition that fills it, not that of a dangerous venture. So it is by and large outside the boundaries of the academic profession that our students must look for the defiant minds of the time.

The traditions of service and scholarship in the university, while noble enough in themselves, were soon corrupted, according to Roszak, "mainly because they have insisted on evaluating the academic, not as a whole personality, but rather as the receptacle of specialized and seemingly detachable talents." Roszak deplored the lack of a moral conscience among scholars, who made no connection between their calling as intellectuals and their social conscience:

> It is this public irrelevance, this esoteric professionalism of scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, that makes it so very difficult to take seriously much of the conventional campus competition between academics and non-academics, between technicians and humanists. For is not the scholar's lack of moral responsiveness really equivalent to the technician's lack of moral discrimination?[8]

The lack of relevance of the Humanities to the vocational orientation of modern majors, most of them technical or scientific, has evoked considerable response from Humanists, some of whom have recognized the culpability of the teachers of the Humanities, just as the radicals had. Herbert Blau said in an assay called "Relevance: The Shadow of a Magnitude," 1969, for instance, that "We answer the call for relevance with proliferating pseudo-knowledge as

the monographs stockpile like Overkill, and we stiffen above the burden of stackdust like the Duc of Guermantes above his years in A La recherche...". Scholars in the Humanities, he said, react to the demands for relevance "by defending their disciplines as if they were eternal verities, when in fact a discipline is sustained only by the moving continuity of its dissolutions. Instead of invoking "standards" to preserve what is clearly going under, we might pay attention to what has been recorded all over our literature — that standards are discovered precisely in jeopardy, as a series of abolitions; as William Carlos Williams says in Paterson, "knowledge undispersed, its own undoing." Essentially he said, echoing Roszak, "What we are all asking for is to reduce the distance between our classes and life, even if it means abandoning our classes." [9]

Walter Poznar, writing in 1977 in Liberal Education, was also concerned with the survival of the Humanities, and came to the conclusion similar to Blau's. "If relevance means anything," he said, "it means a more sensitive awareness of the individual in relation to himself and to his fellow men. It means awakening, within the student, a truer sense of what it is to be human, one person living among a complex network of competing loyalties." The salvation of the Humanities, Poznar felt, would not lie in aping the physical or social sciences or by trying to be relevant and fashionable, but by revealing in themselves the spirit of humanistic learning, by cultivating a critical sense that refuses to imprison life in closed systems of thought. One of the inanities that Humanists have fallen into, thought Poznar, is in making excessive claims for the Humanities, as if they could provide conclusive answers. He proposed a new modesty that would offer:

> Not answers to universal problems or spiritual guidance or the tools to ease our transition from one era of our national life to another, but an intellectual experience that reveals

> without confining, that emphasizes anew the dangers of both absolutism and relativism, that reaffirms the centrality of the individual human being as the ultimate focus on life, that depicts man as master and slave, as genius and victim, that relates us to the human family without wallowing in clinches and abstract benedictions.

Above all, Poznar felt, universities should reemphasize good teaching. Scholars who can transcend narrow disciplines, and convey a broad intellectual vision should be celebrated. Teaching in the Humanities should have primacy over research.[10]

Poznar's reaffirmation of the place of the Humanities to a great extent falls back on the revered traditions. The centrality of man is the essence of Humanistic endeavor. His emphasis on teaching is reminiscent of the Liberal Culture advocates of the turn of the century university. The irony is, that althought Poznar was probably right about placing the emphasis upon teaching rather than research in the Humanities, the very opposite tendency has been reinforced by the troubles of the 'seventies.

The call for social relevance opened a whole pandora's box for the disciplines. Soon after the period of rebellion, new disciplines were being created in response to the demand for "relevance." Black Studies, Women's Studies, Indian Studies, Spanish Studies, etc., came into college curricular with a vengeance. While some of them were well planned and taught, others were quick placeboes for what Humanists thought were needed reinvigorations of their disciplines. As a matter of fact, these new disciplines, in spite of their "relevance," did not all last, and some, the worst of them, brought down the "standards" the Humanists were so anxious to maintain. The infusion of popular culture and media courses, for instance, were not always salubrious, either for the Humanities or for the universities. They became a detriment to more well established programs.

By 1980, this demand for relevance could be felt lingering, but Humanists had tempered their thought somewhat. In 1980, Joseph Duffey argued in Change that:

> The Humanities are no longer a fixed treasure trove of classical wisdom or a repository of antidotes for every contemporary confusion. They are becoming instead a variety of ways to understand the shaping power of human intelligence.

A reasonable extension of this thought was made by John Morris, writing in Liberal Education, who said that "it is the task of the Humanities to explain the life of culture itself, that which forms the very fabric of our lives, all that is summed up in our tradition, and the form of existence which binds us together. ... Our culture has a moral force which we cannot ignore or reject. We might try, but it finally catches us in its tight embrace, and at best we can only adapt so that it changes us slowly in new and creative ways." We cannot roll the clock back and cease being a technocratic soceity, but we must insist that some institution — the university — has the responsibility to reflect upon the values which technology forces upon us. "Only through exposure to the subjects contained in the Humanities can imagination and value triumph over technique, for what is embedded in our cultural forms is the imaginative grasp of the past."[12]

By the late 1970's Humanists were taking a more moderate posture. But the impact of economic scarcity and an oversupply of Ph.D.'s had taken its toll upon the Humanities in the meantime. Much less concern was voiced for social activism and much more for the survival of the Humanities disciplines.

Arthur M. Cohen argued in the same journal in the summer of 1979 that as the vocationally oriented institutions have grown, the Humanities have not kept up. Enrollments in Humanities courses declined considerably during the 1970's. In one survey of all of the constituents of a large community college, the goal of providing and appreciating the Humanities ranked last in a list of nineteen

goals for the college. In the new "People's Colleges," the Humanities are often considered to be elitist. Moreover, Cohen found that members of Humanities faculties were disspirited, fearful for their jobs, battle-weary from defending their work against the two-pronged onslaught from occupational remedial educators. Submerged in a wave of practicalism that has characterized higher education for the last decade, the Humanities are indeed in disarray, suffering in some cases what Cohen calls "a failure of will."[13]

Commonalities in the Humanities do exist: all of the disciplines have an historical perspective, they all love the beauty and the intricacy of man's most elemental and yet sophisticated symbols — language — and they all share a love for narrative, without which humanity would be much the poorer. They all utilize analytic thought, and they all are fascinated with the meaning of ideas. Dialogue is their mode, and metaphor is their tool. At their best, the Humanities disciplines inspire an awe for man's creative power. Vocationalism will never replace the Humanities, though it may change them. Some administrative annoyance is worth the trouble when their contribution to academic life, and to all life for that matter, is considered. It is unlikely that the organizational structure into which the Humanities are locked will change. Celebration of the integral role of the Humanities will involve a dissipation of the prevailing cynicism and a willingness by administrators to help them achieve a better "organizational fit" in colleges. Administrators can help take the stress off the Humanists by placing primary emphasis upon the validity of their teaching and by reaffirming the quintessential value of the Humanities in higher education. Above all, they should do more than tolerate the faculty of dissent. Indeed, they should celebrate it, for at the very least their dissent provides a necessary balance for the prevailing "myth of objective consciousness," as Roszak called it, under which all of us labor.

Notes

[1]The above paragraphs rely heavily upon Laurence R. Veysey's The Emergence of the American University (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965, and the article, "The Plural Organized Worlds of the Humanities," in The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920, edited by Olsen and Voss (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 52-57.

[2]Morton W. Bloomfield, "Elitism in the Humanities," Daedalus (Fall, 1974), p. 130-131.

[3]Albert William Levi, The Humanities Today (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), 57-62.

[4]Bernard Murchland, "The Eclipse of the Liberal Arts," Change (November, 1976), 23-24.

[5]Richard Ohmann, English in America: A Radical View of the Profession (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 11-28.

[6]Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (Boston: Pitman Publishing Company, 1981), 122-123.

[7]Murchland, 25-26.

[8]Theodore Roszak, "On Academic Delinquency," The Dissenting Academy (New York: Random House, 1968), 4-7.

[9]Herbert Blau, "Relevance: The Shadow of a Magnitude," Daedalus 98 (Summer, 1969), 657-670.

[10]Walter Poznar, "The Survival of the Humanities," Liberal Education LXIII (March, 1977), 20-25.

[11]Joseph Duffey, "The Social Meaning of the Humanities," Change 12 (February-March, 1980), p. 42.

[12]John S. Morris, "The Place of the Humanities in the Liberal Arts," Liberal Education LXIV (March, 1978), 51-53.

[13]Arthur M. Cohen, "Issues for the Humanities in the 1980's," Liberal Education 65 (Summer, 1979), 172-181.

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